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Abstract
Drawing upon a unique farm survey in 2003, I nd that in rural China, Full-scale Land
Reallocation (FLR) are more likely to follow egalitarian rule and Partial-scale Land Realloca-
tion (PLR) take productivity of households into consideration. Econometric evidences shows
two main results. First, FLR have positive e¤ect on household land rental behavior, possibly
because egalitarian FLR create a mismatch between household agricultural ability and land
size and after FLR households has to participate in land rental market to adjust the mismatch.
Second, PLR have negative e¤ect on household land rental behavior which supports that land
reallocation and land rental market are substitutes (Brandt, Rozelle and Turner, 2004).
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1 Introduction
"Households in a team are at di¤erent stages of their life cycles and thus have di¤erent labor
endowments. They also have di¤erent levels of education, experience, and other abilities. As a
consequence, the equal land-person ratio across households in a team generates a potential allocative
ine¢ ciency."
     Yifu Lin (1988)
Development of land rental market is important for increasing farm output in developing coun-
tries, because it equalize marginal production among households which is the condition of maximal
total agricultural output. Land rental market exhibit its salient role when the other two factor
markets are distorted: land sales market would incur speculation and credit market is closely re-
lated to amount of land of villagers (Deininger and Feder, 2001). This is especially true in China.
For example, there is no land sale market since farmers only enjoy land use right in rural China and
formal credit available to farmers is scant due to the under developed local nancial institutions.
In recent years, China has witnessed a emerging land rental market, shown in Figure 1. Yet,
is there any factors retarding the development of a healthy land rental market in rural China.
Conventional wisdom in the literature imply that since village leaders periodically reallocate land
from low productive households to high productive ones, administrative land reallocation and
land rental market are substitutes in rural China (Brandt, Rozelle and Turner, 2004). Therefore,
land reallocation has negative e¤ect on household land rental behavior. However, arable land is
reallocated in two ways in rural China which is overlooked by previous studies investigating the
e¤ect of land reallocation on household land rental behavior: Full-scale Land Reallocation (FLR)
and Partial-scale Land Reallocation (PLR). In the process of FLR, village leaders conscate all
the land of households and then distribute land equally among villagers. In the process of Partial-
scale Land Reallocation, village leaders only reallocate a part of one households land to another
household.
In this paper, I evaluate the relative impacts of FLR and PLR on household land rental behavior
in rural China.
Drawing upon a unique data set surveyed by Development Research Centre (DRC) in 2003,
I nd evidences showing that FLR is more likely to follow egalitarian rule of land distribution
and in the process of PLR village leaders reallocate land from low productive households to high
productive ones.
A further detailed econometric analysis of a sample of 2102 households shows that, certeris
paribus, households experienced more FLR are more likely to rent in or out land while households
experienced more PLR are less likely to rent in land or out land. These results are robust to
alternative model specications and alternative measures of FLR and PLR. It also seems that our
main results are not driven by outliers.
I attribute the positive e¤ect of FLR on household land rental behavior to the fact that in the
process of FLR, egalitarianism create a mismatch between household agricultural ability and land
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size, after FLR, households has to participate in land rental market to adjust this mismatch. Since
land rental behavior induced of FLR is to recover household land to its previous size, I name it as
Recovery Land Rental. In contrast, because the mismatch between agricultural ability and land
size has been adjusted in the process of PLR, I observe that PLR has negative e¤ect on household
land rental behavior and PLR and land rental markets are substitutes (Brandt, Huang, Li and
Rozelle, 2002; Brandt, Rozelle and Turner, 2004).
Egalitarian land distribution among farmers is ubiquitous in the world (Binswanger, Bour-
guignon and van den Brink, 2009) and farmers benet (i.e., equity and e¢ ciency) from the egali-
tarianism (Deininger and Jin, 2005). However, farmers are endowed with di¤erent farming abilities,
egalitarian distribution of land create a mismatch between farmersability and land size. Although
several scholars have noticed the nature of allocative ine¢ ciency of egalitarian land distribution
(Lin, 1988; Dong, 1996), quantitative evidence in the literature is scant. The contribution of our
paper is that I provide a new interpretation of why egalitarian land reallocation have positive e¤ect
on household land rental behavior.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In section 2, I introduce the background and
literature on the topic of land rental in rural China. Section 3 is data, conjecture and stylized
facts. Section 4 is a framework introducing why FLR and PLR would a¤ect household land rental
behavior. Econometric model used in the paper is provided in section 5. Section 6 is the empirical
results as well as robustness checks. Section 7 is a simple welfare analysis of land rental market in
rural China. Section 8 concludes.
2 Background and Literature Review
2.1 Rural Farm Land System in China
Communal arrangement of agricultural production in rural China failed because its rewarding
system is too equal to create enough incentive for farming (Perkins, 1988). In order to overcome
such a deciency, the state introduces the Household Responsibility System (HRS) to rural between
1978 and 1984. Under HRS, village land is allocated to households on a per capita basis with a land
contract between villagers and village leaders. After paying local taxes1 and meeting a mandatory
transferring grain quota which involves delivering a certain amount of grain at a below-market price
to the state procurement system, farmers can reap benets from the land using. This kind of land
institution has provided unexpected incentives to farmers for farming and caused unprecedented
production growth in subsequent years (Lin, 1992). However, from the perspective of property
rights, farmers only enjoy temporary land use right and land ownership is still in the hands of
collectives (e.g., administrative village or natural village). So land cannot be sold under HRS
system.
Fearing that insecure land tenure would dampen famersworking incentives, central government
1Agricultural tax has been progressively waived from 2002 to 2006 (Kennedy, 2007).
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extend the land contracting period from 15 years in 1984 to 30 years in 1993. And in Land
Management Law (1998), Rural Land Contract Law (2003) and Property Law (2007), central
government further emphasize that within land contracting period, land cannot be reallocated
among households. However, inuenced by communist ideology, survey evidence suggest that
to adjust land distribution for population changes among the households (e.g., death, birth and
daughter marriage), village leaders break up the initial contract and continuously reallocate land
between households with population change to keep egalitarian distribution of arable land in the
village (Liu, Carter, and Yao, 1998; Brandt, Huang, Li, and Rozelle, 2002; Kimura, Otsuka, Sonobe
and Rozelle, 2011). For example, village leaders may reallocate land from a household with a
member loss (e.g., death) to a household with a member addition (e.g., new baby).
The main actors in the process of land reallocation are village leaders, including party secretary,
village head and accountant. Survey evidences shows that village leaders conduct land reallocation
in two ways: Full-scale Land Reallocation (FLR) and Partial-scale Land Reallocation (PLR). FLR
is conducted on a whole village basis: village leaders unscramble the current allocation of land in
the whole village and then allocate land among villagers on a per capita basis. On the contrary,
PLR is conducted on a case-by-case basis: village leaders only reallocate land of a small portion of
households who need to do so (e.g., population change and e¢ ciency consideration). For example,
households who leave their land fallow or farm less intensively because of being short of farm labor
will su¤er from land conscation and their land will be redistributed to other households who farm
intensively (Rozelle and Li, 1998).
While land reallocation is only one way to transfer land among households, the other way of land
transferring in rural China is through land rental market. In fact within the contracting periods,
villagers has rights to rent their land to other households (Central NO.1 Notice, 1984). Land rental
rights of villagers are further emphasized in Rural Land Contract Law (2003) and promoted in
Central NO.1 Document (2010).
2.2 Related Literature on Land Reallocation and Land Rental Market
in China
Brandt, Rozelle and Turner (2004) argues that since village leaderschances of promotion and bonus
are closely related to aggregate village farm output, they have incentives to reallocate land from
low productive households to high productive ones through periodic land reallocation2. In contrast,
the function of land rental market is also to transfer land from low intensive users to high intensive
ones. Consequently, administrative land reallocation and land rental market are substitutes (i.e.,
Substitution Hypothesis) and land reallocation should have negative e¤ect on household land rental
behavior.
This view is supported in Deininger and Jin (2005). They nd that households with high
2Several studies have shown that local economic performance is an important indicator for promotion of local
leaders in China (Chen, Li and Zhou, 2005; Li, 2011; Xu, 2011).
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farming ability receive more land administratively and households with low farming ability are
more likely to lose their land during the process of land reallocation3.
However, substitution hypothesis is not always supported by empirical evidence. For example,
Yao (2000) and Kung (2002) nd positive and signicant e¤ect of land reallocation on household
land rental behavior. But existing literature lack a coherent explanation4 of why land reallocation
has positive e¤ect on household land rental behavior. This paper is an attempt to ll this gap.
3 Data, Conjecture and Stylized Facts
3.1 Data and Variables
The data set used in this study is obtained through a random multistage clustered farm survey
conducted by the DRC in 2003. There are six provinces in the survey: Hunan in the south, Sichuan
in the middle, Zhejiang, Fujian, Anhui in the south east, and Heilongjiang in the north east. In each
province, 2 counties were randomly selected. In the next step, 8 villages were randomly selected
from each selected county. At the village level, one of the main village cadres (i.e., village head,
party secretary, or accountant) answered a questionnaire including detailed information regarding
the criterion of land reallocation. Finally about 22 households were randomly selected from each
villages registration book and then interviews were conducted both with household head and
every member in the household. Household interview cover a broad range of information including
number FLR and PLR experienced by the household since HRS, o¤-farm working activities, land
rental market participation status, individual demographic characteristics, etc. After data cleaning,
I nally have a valid sample of 2102 households from 95 villages. The geographical locations of the
six provinces are shown in Figure 2.
One interesting pattern for FLR and PLR at village level in the data is that after the introduc-
tion of HRS, among the 89 villages5, 5 villages did not conduct any land reallocation (No FLR and
PLR); 25 villages conducted only FLR (Only FLR); 33 villages conducted only PLR (Only PLR);
26 villages conducted both FLR and PLR (Both FLR and PLR). There is also a large variation
of frequency of FLR and PLR at province level: in Anhui province, 100 percent villages have con-
ducted FLR and 60 percent villages have conducted PLR since HRS; in Fujian province, 87 percent
villages conducted FLR while 14 percent villages conducted PLR since HRS; for the 16 villages in
Heilongjiang province, 50 percent villages conducted FLR and 56 percent villages conducted PLR
since HRS; in Hunan province, 43 percent villages conducted FLR and all the 16 villages conducted
3But Deininger and Jin (2005) also point out that administrative land reallocation is not as e¢ cient as land
rental market in improving farm production.
4Kung (2002) argue that because o¤-farm economy is developing so rapidly that mere land reallocation is in-
su¢ cient to adjust household will of demand and supply of land. This explanation may not be quite appropriate
because o¤-farm development has been holding constant in the household regression model.
5The original data includes 95 villages. We have no information for FLR in 4 villages and for PLR in 2 villages.
In order to make the classication of No FLR and PLR, Only FLR, Only PLR and Both FLR and PLR, we lose 6
villages in the sample subsequently.
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PLR since HRS; in Sichuan province, 21 percent villages conducted FLR and all the 16 villages
conducted PLR since HRS; in Zhejiang province, among all the 16 villages, 44 percent villages
conducted FLR and 69 percent villages conducted PLR since HRS. Since village level or province
level frequency of land reallocation may introduce measure error in the regression6, household level
frequency of land reallocation is used in the analysis. For the total 2102 households in the sample,
295 households experienced no FLR and PLR, 1094 households experienced only FLR, 537 house-
holds experienced only PLR and 176 households experienced both FLR and PLR since HRS. Our
key independent variables are number of FLR or PLR experienced by the household since HRS.
The dependent variable in the Probit model is a dummy indicating whether the household has
rented in or out land. The dependent variable in the Tobit model is area of land the household has
rented in or out.
Summary statistics of variables in the regression is provided in Table 1. Overall, all the variables
have the expected range. The mean frequency of FLR and PLR at household are small, 1.44 and
0.7 respectively. The maximum frequency of FLR and PLR is 8 and 20 respectively. Percentage
of households who have rented in or out land is 15% and 10% respectively. The mean area of land
rented in or out is 1.43 and 0.23 mu7.
Appendix Table A provides the denition of variables used in the paper and rationales of controls
are introduced in the section of econometric model.
3.2 Recovery Land Rental : Why FLR and PLR May A¤ect Household
Land Rental Behavior?
In terms of Substitution Hypothesis (Brandt, Rozelle, and Turner, 2004), there are actually two
aspects that land reallocation would substitute the e¤ect of land rental market. First, if some
households have a­ uent arable land to farm and some households have no arable land to farm
in the village, egalitarian land reallocation will alleviate land-labor mismatch (i.e., Substitution
E¤ect One, SEO). Second, because of career concern of village leaders, they reallocate land from
households with low farming ability to households with high farming ability to improve overall
production in the village. In this sense, land reallocation also substitutes the e¤ect of land rental
market (i.e., Substitution E¤ect Two, SET). I argue that although egalitarian distribution of land
signicantly reduce land-labor mismatch, there still exist mismatch between farming ability and
land size across individuals. Therefore, after egalitarian land reallocation, households are more
likely to participate in land rental market to adjust the mismatch between farming ability and land
size.
With respect to FLR and PLR in our paper, if FLR is more likely to follow egalitarian rule
of land reallocation, then households experienced more FLR should have larger mismatch between
6If a villages conducts only PLR, some households which do not experience any PLRs may be assumed to be
a¤ected in the regression by using village level frequency of land reallocation.
7One mu is 0.0667 hectare.
6
farming ability and land size8. Therefore households experienced more FLR are more likely to rent
in or rent out land to adjust the mismatch. Here I name household land rental behavior because of
mismatch created by egalitarian FLR as Recovery Land Rental, because households have to rely on
land rental market to recover their land size to the original size because of FLR. If in the process
of PLR, village leaders reallocate land from low intensive users to high intensive ones, there should
be negative e¤ect of PLR on household land rental behavior.
Can I nd evidences showing the FLR is more likely to follow egalitarian rule in the
data? I believe so. There are several pieces of evidence which imply FLR is more likely to follow
egalitarian rule. First, among 57 villages conducting FLR in the past, 36 villagesvillage leaders
report that the most important reason to conduct FLR is following command from higher level
o¢ cials, 14 villages report that FLR is conducted because of population change, 2 villages report
that FLR is conducted because of land occupation because of development of township enterprise. It
seems that the most important reason for conducting FLR is command from upper level government.
Since central government emphasize land egalitarianism in rural China, I expect that higher level
o¢ cials command is more closely follow the egalitarian criterion of land reallocation. Therefore,
after FLR, land is more equally distributed in the village. Second, according to answers of multiple
choice question of procedures in conducting FLR in 57 villages, shown in table 2, I found that the
process of FLR is very complex: 85.5 percent of villages organize a villagerssession, 72.7 percent of
villages select villagersdeputy, 72.7 percent of villages will estimate the size of land9, 74.6 percent
of villages do a lottery of land for very individual and 70.9 percent of villages would issuing a new
land contract. In such a complex process of FLR, I expect that transparency and accountability
is high. So if all villagers treasure the sparse asset (i.e., arable land), bargain powers10 owned
by villagers should render FLR create an egalitarian distribution of land in the village. Third, I
found that the gini coe¢ cient for the 1094 households who experienced only FLR is 0.559 which
is smaller than the gini coe¢ cient 0.567 for these 537 households who experienced only PLR11.
Although there are still confounding factors, statistically this 0.8 percent point di¤erence suggests
that FLR really create a more egalitarian distribution of land for households who experienced
only FLR than households experienced only PLR. I can also dynamically look at the di¤erence
8There are two points here. First, we assume that individual level mismatch will translate into household level
mismatch between household farming ability and land size. We will elaborate this notion in the conceptual framework
part. Second, mismatch between household farming ability and land size created by FLR is proportional to frequency
of FLR in the household level. Robustness checks will be conducted for this assumption in the empirical part.
9Village leaders will rst grade land according to its quality, so the pieces of land household received is quality
adjusted (Lin, 1988; Liu, Carter and Yao, 1998).
10Actually, villagers have this kind of bargain power because all the villages in the sample have introduced Village
Leader Election Institutions. Villagers can easily threat the village leaders not to vote them if they cannot obtain
their "per capita land" in the village and previous studies have shown that this bargain process exists in rural China
(Yao, 2004; Brandt, Rozelle, and Turner, 2004).
11We did not list the gini coe¢ cients according to frequency of FLR and PLR, because we should, in some sense,
"control" FLR when computing gini for PLR and "control" PLR when computing gini for FLR. Computing gini for
households who experienced only FLR and for households who experienced only PLR maybe a possible way for such
"control".
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of average gini coe¢ cient of per capita arable land before and after the last FLR in the village.
For the 57 villages conducted FLR, before the last time FLR, the average gini of per capita arable
land is 0.21. However, after FLR the gini becomes 0.15 which suggests that after FLR land is
more equally distributed in the village. Fourth, if mismatch between farming ability and land
size in the household exists after FLR, I expect that willingness of changing current land holding
should be di¤erent across households experienced FLR or PLR. Table 3 shows that the percentage
of households who want to increase or decrease their land holding is highest (60.45%) in villages
only conducting FLR while it is lowest (47.46%) in villages only conducting PLR12. And villages
conducting both FLR and PLR stand in the middle (51.13%). This evidence reects that in the
process of PLR, village leaders may reallocate land from "lazy" households to intensive households
while FLR did not take household farming ability into account which is an ine¢ cient way of land
reallocation compared with PLR.
So is there any evidence showing that PLR is more e¢ cient or "doing a better
work" in the data? There are 2 points here. First, I assume that if village leaders care about
their career and reallocate land from low productive households to high productive households
(Brandt, Huang, Li and Rozelle, 2002; Brandt, Rozelle, and Turner, 2004), they will do it the
mode of PLR. Because it is hard to imagine that household A in a village becomes productive (i.e.,
grown up of children) and household B becomes unproductive (i.e., aging), then village leaders in
this village conduct FLR to initiate villagerssession, select villagersdeputy, estimate size of land,
do a lottery and issue new land contract. The cost is too high if the aim is to reallocate some land
from Household B to household A13. Therefore village leaders are more likely to conduct PLR if
they want to reallocate land from low intensive households to high intensive ones. Third, I can
show that there is a signicant correlation between household farming productivity and PLR. After
regressing14 frequency of PLR in the household on farm production, household head age, household
head age square, per capita land, household education index, dependent ratio, female ratio and
province dummies, I nd that the coe¢ cient of farm production is positive and signicant at 1
percent level. This partially support that PLR is conducted depending on household productivity.
These evidences may support the conjecture that "e¢ cient" way of land reallocation take place
mainly in the form of PLR.
From the facts of FLR and PLR listed above, I state our hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis. Households experienced more FLR are more likely to participate in land rental
market to adjust the mismatch created by egalitarian land reallocation between farming ability and
12We divided the sample into 4 groups: villages conducting no FLR and PLR, villages conducting only PLR,
villages conducting both FLR and PLR and villages conducting only FLR.
13In FLR, suppose that the benet P = PA   PB is the production improvement by reallocating A land from
A to B where PA is production of household A after FLR and PB is production of household B after FLR. The cost
is T + nM where T is time cost in organizing FLR in the village, and M is production loss because of egalitarian
distribution of land which is assumed to be constant across households and n is number of households in the village.
If T + nM is much larger than P , village leaders would not conduct FLR and conducting PLR is highly possible.
14Full estimation results are available upon request. Farm production is value of agricultural output measured at
market price.
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land size; households experienced with more PLR are less likely to participate in land rental market
because PLR and land rental market are substitutes.
3.3 A First Glance at Correlation
Is there any descriptive correlation between land reallocation and household land rental behavior?
Table 4 summarizes land reallocation and land rental facts across the six provinces. It seems that
there is no clear correlation between land reallocation frequency and household land rental behavior.
For example, Heilongjiang has the lowest land reallocation frequency (0.89), yet the percentage of
household renting in land is neither the lowest or highest.
Since aggregate level measure of land reallocation and household land rental behavior may
introduce measurement error, I resort to Figures 3 and 4 to examine the correlation between land
reallocation and household land rental behavior. The horizontal line is number of FLR in Figure
3 and is number of PLR in Figure 4. The vertical line in Figures A, B, C and D are percentage of
households rented in land, percentage of households rented out land, average size of land rented in
and average size of land rented out.
Clearly our hypothesis is supported in Figures 3 and 4: there is a positive relationship between
FLR and household land rental behavior and a negative association between PLR and household
land rental behavior.
However, I do not know whether these associations are statistically signicant. Neither do I
know whether land reallocation picked up the e¤ect of omitted factors. Therefore, I resort to the
formal regression analysis in the next sections.
4 Conceptual Framework
In this section, I propose a conceptual framework to think about how and under what conditions
FLR and PLR may a¤ect household land rental behavior. Consider the equation
ai = X
0
 + "i (1)
where ai is the farming ability of household i and X
0
is a vector of variables determining
household farming ability including female ratio, education level, number of labor, age structure
and so on. I dene the residual farming ability of the household as
^
"i = ai   X 0
^
 where
^

is estimated coe¢ cients of X
0
in equation (1). Farming ability
^
"i is di¤erent across individuals
because of di¤erent personality and smartness among villagers15.
15Actually in labor economics, ability di¤erence among students is a key to understand the outcome of education.
Many scholars have try di¤erent methods to overcome this omitted factor in regression analysis: randomness in
lottery (Angrist, 1990), instrumental variable method (Angrist, 1991) and identical twins (Zhang, Liu, and Yung,
2007).
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4.1 Full-scale Land Reallocation: Mismatch and Tenure Insecurity
4.1.1 Autarchy Before FLR
Suppose that the optimal land size for household i corresponding to ability
^
"i is A which is
represented as vertical line jABj in Figure 5. I rst consider households who are in autarchy in the
sense that these households own the optimal land size and do not need to participate in land rental
market to adjust land holding. After FLR if the household land size is smaller than optimal land
size, shown in Figure 5A, jABj>jCDj, then these households16 would rent in land with size jDEj
(i.e., Demand Recovery Land Rental). In contrast after FLR if household land size is larger than
optimal land size, jABj<jCDj shown in Figure 5B, then these household, after FLR, would rent
out land with size jDEj (i.e., Supply Recovery Land Rental).
In summary, unless all the households in autarchy has the same farming ability and household
size and farming ability matched the land size after FLR optimally, then there is no positive e¤ect
of FLR on household land rental behavior. Otherwise, I should expect a positive e¤ect of FLR on
household land rental behavior for households in autarchy.
4.1.2 Renting in Land Before FLR
Now I look at what happened after FLR for households who initially want to rent in land after
FLR. Figure 6A shows that after FLR, household land size decreases. jABj is the optimal land size
for the household with agricultural ability
^
"i, jBCj is the land size in the household. After FLR,
household land size becomes jDEj. In order to adjust land size to agricultural ability, household
will rent in land with size jEGj where jEFj is land size which need to be recovered17 because of
FLR and jFGj is land size the household want to rent in without FLR.
Figure 6B shows that after FLR, household land size increases. If the increase of land size jEFj
after FLR just equals to the land size the household want to rent in jACj, then there is no land
rental behavior for this household after FLR. As shown in Figure 6C, if the increase of land size
jEGj after FLR is larger than jACj, the household will rent out land with size jFGj. As before, I can
call jFGj as Supply Recovery Land Rental. Figure 6D shows that if the increase of land jEFj after
FLR is smaller than the land size the household want to rent in jACj, then the household would
rent in land with size jFGj. In Figure 6D, it seems that FLR is e¢ cient because FLR decrease the
mismatch between land size and agricultural ability.
16Unless under very strict conditions, individual level mismatch between land size and individual agricultural
ability can translate into household level mismatch between household level farming ability and land size. For
example, in a village where all the household only have two members. In a typical household of this village, matched
land area of membersfarm ability is A and B. Here suppose A > S and B < S where S is village per capital land
size S distributed to household members. If jA  Sj = jB   Sj, then there is no mismatch between household farm
ability and land size after egalitarian land reallocation. So we can see that this condition is too mechanical and very
rare satised in the real world.
17Demand Recovery Land Rental.
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In sum, only in the case of Figure 6B, there is no e¤ect of FLR on household land rental
behavior. Otherwise, I expect a positive e¤ect of FLR on household land rental behavior.
4.1.3 Renting out Land Before FLR
Now consider the case when the household want to rent out land before FLR. In Figure 7A, jABj
is the optimal land holding for the household and jBCj is the land size for this household. So the
household want to rent out land with size jACj. If household land size increases to jDFj after FLR,
then Supply Recovery Land Rental size is jEFj.
After FLR, if the land size decreases to jDEj which is equals to jABj, shown in Figure 7B, then
the household would not participate in land rental market.
Figure 7C shows that after FLR, land size decreases to jDFj which is smaller than jACj, then
the household still need to rent out land with size jEFj. FLR is e¢ cient in this case.
Figure 7D shows that after FLR, land size decreases jDEj, the household need to rent in land
jEFj to match its farming ability (i.e., Demand Recovery Land Rental).
Only accidently in Figure 7B, FLR has no e¤ect on household land rental behavior. Otherwise,
there exists positive e¤ect of FLR on household land rental behavior18.
4.1.4 Tenure Insecurity
Previous studies have found that land reallocation is a form of tenure insecurity to the household19
(Yang. 1997; Jacoby, Li, and Rozelle, 2002) and tenure insecurity has negative e¤ect on household
land rental behavior (Deininger and Jin, 2008; Noev, 2008; Kimura, Otsuka, Sonobe, and Rozelle,
2011). Following this kind of logic, FLR should have negative e¤ect on household land rental
behavior.
I can assume that the marginal e¤ect of tenure insecurity for FLR on household land rental
behavior is  < 0. In contrast, suppose the marginal e¤ect of mismatch for FLR on household
land rental behavior is  > 0.
Consequently, I may observe three possible outcomes concerning the e¤ect of FLR on household
land rental behavior empirically. If jj > jj, there exists negative e¤ect of FLR on household
land rental behavior. If jj < jj, the e¤ect of FLR on household land rental behavior should be
positive and I estimate a lower bound of the e¤ect of mismatch on household land rental behavior.
If jj = jj, there is no e¤ect of FLR on household land rental behavior.
18In the paper, household land rental behavior means household land rental in both demand and supply side.
19"The more times that land was reallocated in a village, the more likely that a farmer would lose a particular
plot of land. Insecurity was exacerbated if the dates of a village-wide adjustment were not known in advance" in
Brandt, Huang, Li and Rozelle (2002).
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4.2 Partial-scale Land Reallocation: Substitution Hypothesis
Since the main motivation of land reallocation is population change, land should be equally dis-
tributed in rural20. So I expect that if substitution e¤ect exist, it should be SET. As conjectured
before, if village leaders intend to increase agricultural production through reallocating land, they
mainly do this in the form of PLR. Consequently, I expect that the e¤ect of PLR on household
land rental behavior is negative.
Graphically speaking, I can refer to Figure 8. Suppose that line jABj is the land holding of
household X and line jDFj is the land holding of household Y . Yet, the optimal land holding for
household X is jBCj and the optimal land holding for household Y is jDEj, according to household
level agricultural ability. If after PLR where village leaders reallocate some land from household Y
to household X, household Xs land holding becomes jGIj and household Y s land holding becomes
jJKj. If jHIj=jKLj21, then both household X and household Y do not need to participate in land
rental market to adjust their land holding. If jHIj>jKLj, then household X still need to rent in land
with size jHIj-jKLj which is smaller than the land area X supposing to rent in jACj before PLR
and household Y do not need to participate in land rental market. If jHIj<jKLj, then household Y
still need to rent out land with size jKLj-jHIj which is also smaller than land area Y supposing to
rent out jEFj before PLR and household X do not need to participate in land rental market this
time.
In all these cases, I should expect that there is a negative e¤ect of PLR22 on household land
rental behavior.
5 Econometric Model
A basic form of equation to be estimated is as follows:
Pr(Rinip = 1jX) = F (in0 + in1 flrip + in2 plrip +H
0
in3 + V
0
in4 + 
in
p ) (2)
Pr(Routip = 1jX) = F (out0 + out1 flrip + out2 plrip +H
0
out3 + V
0
out4 + 
out
p ) (3)
where equation 2 is the Probit model23 in the demand side and equation 3 is the Probit model
20Even for PLR, this is also true. For example, among all the 63 villages conducting PLR, in 49 villages, village
leaders only reallocate land of households who have population change in the process of PLR. Before the last time
PLR, the average gini in all villages is 0.22 and after PLR, the average gini is 0.17.
21Here jHIj=jACj and jKLj=jEFj.
22There are two ways for village leaders to conduct PLR. First, they may reallocate some land from an unpro-
ductive household to a productive household. Second, they may reallocate some land from village exible land (i.e.,
Jidongtian) to a productive household. In both cases, households received more PLR are less likely to participate
in land rental market to adjust their land holding because PLR has adjust their land holding according to their
farming ability.
23Because our dependent variable is a dummy, to suppress the predicted probability between zero and one, we
choose Probit model. In the section of empirical results, we also experiment with other dummy dependent variable
models as a robustness check.
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in the supply side. F (:) denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Rinip is a
dummy indicating whether household i in province p has rented in land and Routip is also a dummy
denoting whether household i in province p has rented out land. 0 is a constant. flrip is the
frequency of FLR experienced by i, plrip is the frequency of PLR experienced by i. The coe¢ cients
of interest throughout the paper is in1 ; 
out
1 ; 
in
2 and 
out
2 (i.e., the e¤ects of FLR and PLR on
household land rental behavior). If the e¤ect of mismatch on household land rental is larger than
the e¤ect of tenure security for FLR, I expect in1 > 0 and 
out
1 > 0
24; if SET exists in the process of
PLR, I expect that in2 < 0 and 
out
2 < 0
25. In order to control for factors which are common within
the province and a¤ect household land rental behavior, province xed e¤ects p (i.e., province
dummies) are included in equations (2) and (3).
In order to alleviate omitted variable bias, I included a vector of household characteristics found
to be important for household land rental behavior, H
0
. Per capita arable land is included because I
expect that households with more arable land are more likely to rent out land and less likely to rent
in land (Lin, 1995)26. Household head age and head age square are also included in H
0
. Household
head is the major labor force in the household, so his or her age may reect the overall household life
cycle27. I also include cadre household dummy because cadre household may enjoy various o¤-farm
opportunities or gray incomes, so cadre household may not need to farm for a living. Therefore I
expect that cadre households are less likely to participate in land rental market (Zhang, Ma and Xu,
2004). Household head education level is also included (i.e., illiteracy, primary school, junior high
school, high school, college, university or higher). Higher education may represent higher farming
management ability which will incur such households to rent in land and not to rent out land.
Following Jin and Deininger (2009), I also include household labor age structure (i.e., household
population whose age is less than 16 years old, household population whose age is between 16 and
60, household population whose age is larger than 60 years old. Moreover, female ratio in the
24Actually, if FLR provides egalitarian distribution of land in the village, there should be SEO in the process of
FLR (i.e., FLR equalize land-labor ratio in the village and thus reduce landless in the village). However, if we still
estimate a positive e¤ect of FLR on household land rental, that means the mismatch e¤ect of FLR is larger enough
to overcome the negative e¤ect of tenure insecurity and the negative e¤ect of SEO. We omit the detail discussion of
SEO in the paper, because as early as 1980s, land-labor ratio in rural China is very equal (Lin, 1988). So SEO, if
exist, maybe quite small in reality. Moreover, in both the conceptual framework and econometric model, per capita
arable land is always controlled for in the sense that we are comparing households with more FLR to households
with less FLR at the same level of land-labor ratio, so SEO is e¤ectively controlled for in our case.
25Kung and Bai (2011) show that tenure created by FLR is more insecure than tenure created by PLR because
farmers cannot keep the same plots after FLR and PLR is predictable. However, even if PLR also created tenure
insecurity and in2 < 0 and 
out
2 < 0, 
in
2 and 
out
2 are the combined negative e¤ects of SET and tenure insecurity.
Moreover, one may argue that because the main motivation of PLR is population change, PLR also created egalitarian
distribution of land in the village. Yet if in2 and 
out
2 are still negative, 
in
2 and 
out
2 are the combined negative
e¤ects of SET and tenure insecurity plus the positive e¤ect of mismatch created by PLR. To make the discussion
simple, we omit the tenure insecurity and mismatch created by PLR.
26Actually, Deinigner and Jin (2005) nd that land rental market contribute to equity goal in the village (i.e.,
there is negative e¤ect of per capita arable land on household land rental behavior).
27In agricultural sector age is an important indicator for farming experience, so higher age of the household head
may induce more land to rent in and less land to rent out (Vranken and Swinnen, 2006; Neov, 2008). However, very
old farmers su¤er from physical constraint of farming, so we include the square to capture the life cycle e¤ect of age.
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household is also included. Households with more labors between age 16 and 6028 or with more
male29 should be more likely to rent in land and less likely to rent out land. I also control for
share of o¤-farm workers in the household. It is hypothesized that households with more members
participating in o¤-farm work is more likely to rent out land30 and less likely to rent in land (Lin,
1988; Deininger and Jin, 2005). Agricultural tax31 is also included in the regression model. Since
it is the custom for out-renters to transfer agricultural taxes to in-renters in rural China (Lohmar,
Zhang and Somwaru, 2001), high agricultural tax may induce transaction cost for land renting
(Coase, 1937, 1960) and thus will suppress land rental on both demand and supply side32. I also
include nonfarm asset of the household in the regression. Nonfarm assets include value of houses,
transportation instruments, small business assets and so on. The higher value of nonfarm asset, the
more likely the household will rent out their land, because they can easily diversify their income if
they want (Deininger and Jin, 2005). Number of hog and cattle in the household, representing farm
assets, are also contained in the regression. Hogs can provide fertilizer for farming while cattle are
important farm draft power (Rozenzweig and Wolpin, 1993), so they should have positive e¤ects
on household land rental behavior in demand side and negative e¤ects on household land rental
behavior in supply side.
V
0
is a vector of village control variables. Distance of the village to county centre is included to
capture o¤-farm work opportunities. The nearer of the village to county centre, the more o¤-farm
work opportunities and consequently households in these villages are more likely to rent out land
and less likely to rent in land (Lin, 1988). Following the literature (Deininger and Jin, 2005; Jin and
Deininger, 2009), I also included a dummy indicating whether household who want to rent in or out
land need village leaderssanction because this can be considered as a sort of transaction cost33.
Land rental market should be inactive in these villages where sanction of land rental is needed.
In the end, the average cash rent in the village is included as the last village control variable34.
Higher rent represents higher transaction cost of land rental and thus will induce less household
renting in land. In contrast, higher rent means more prots for out-renters, so higher rent should
28Peoples prime age for working.
29In terms of physical work, male should be more productive than female. In our case, farming is by and large
physical work.
30The reason is that if many members in the household participate in o¤-farm work, there should be less available
labor for farming. So these households are more likely to rent out the unfarmed land or under farmed land for rent.
31Although agricultural tax start to cancel in year 2000, at the time of our survey in 2003, there are many places
exerting agricultural tax to farm households.
32Actually, owning more land will incur cash-unavailable grain quota task and thus can also insert transaction
cost for land rental (Lohmar, Zhang and Somwaru, 2001). Yet no more than 5% of households in the sample still
hold grain quota and the variable of grain quota is not signicant in the regression, so we drop this variable in the
analysis.
33Central NO.1 Notice (1984) specify that households who want to rent in or out land need the sanction of village
leaders. However, in Rural Land Contract Law (2003), this restriction is removed.
34There are three ways in which rent was paid in our sample: paying a certain amount of output; paying cash
rent; nothing. The reason why there exists zero rent is that if out-renters leave their land fallow, village leader may
reallocate their land in the next round of land reallocation (Yang, 1997; Kimura, Otsuka, Sonobe and Rozelle, 2011).
So in order to keep use rights of land, households being lack of farm labor will rent out their land and charge nothing.
There are only six households who employ sharecropping (average rent is 20% of production) as the method to pay
rent, so there should be little incentive issue in our sample (Otsuka, Chuma and Hayami, 1992).
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have positive e¤ect on household land rental on supply side35.
By replacing R with a continuous variable A indicating area rented in or out, I can estimate
similar equations of (2) and (3). Because of the obvious left censoring problem (i.e., 85% households
did not rent in land and 90% households did not rent out land) of A, I use Tobit model to avoid
negative predicted rental area after regression (Tobin, 1958). Maximum Likelihood Estimation
method would be used to derive the coe¢ cients of our interest.
6 Empirical Results
6.1 Main Results
6.1.1 Demand Side Results
This section presents our main results. Table 5 reports estimation results in the demand side
while Table 6 is the estimation results in the supply side. All standard errors in the paper are
Whites standard errors which are totally robust against arbitrary heteroskedasticity and clustered
at province level36 (Hayashi, 2000).
Columns 1 to 3 in Table 5 report Probit model estimation results of household land rental
behavior in the demand side. In column 1, I nd that the e¤ect of FLR on whether household
would rent in land is positive and highly signicant, 0.083 with a standard error of 0.02. The more
FLR the household experienced in the past, the more likely they will rent in land. This suggests
that the e¤ect of mismatch between agricultural ability and land size created by FLR on household
land rental dominates the e¤ect of tenure insecurity on household land rental. In contrast, there
exist a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect of PLR on whether household would rent in
land, -0.065 with a standard error of 0.029. It implies that SET works where PLR substitute the
e¤ect of land rental market (Brandt, Rozelle, and Turner, 2004). Column 2 of Table 5 is results
where household controls and village level controls are added and column 3 of Table 5 further adds
province xed e¤ects. It seems that the addition of these control variables does not a¤ect our
baseline ndings.
Columns 4 to 6 of Table 5 provide the estimation results of Tobit model in demand side. Column
4 of Table 5 are the e¤ect of FLR and PLR on area of land rented in and columns 5 and 6 further
add covariates and province xed e¤ects respectively. In all cases, there is a positive e¤ect of FLR
on area rented in, 2.114 with a standard error of 0.674 and a negative e¤ect of PLR on area rented
in, -1.323 with standard error of 0.658 in column 6 of Table 5.
Although with a number of controls, the explanatory power of the Probit and Tobit are not
35We take village rent as the average cash rent per mu in the village, thus our measure of rent is crude. Moreover,
rent and the area of rented in or out may be determined simultaneously. For example, households who want to rent
in large area of land usually have higher farming ability, so out-renters in this case obtain higher bargain power and
the rent increases accordingly (e.g., equilibrium result). So our estimation result for rent should be interpreted with
caution.
36We assume households are independent across provinces but can be serial correlated within province.
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large. The pseudo R-square in column 3 and 6 are 0.11 and 0.06 respectively. However, if I set the
tted value to one if it is larger than half unit and zero otherwise, the correctly predicted values in
columns 3 is 85% which is pretty high.
Overall, the message I get from estimation results in demand side is very clear: the more FLR
experienced by the household in the past, the more severe the mismatch is between household
farming ability and land size (i.e., allocation ine¢ ciency), thus those households are more likely to
adjust their land holdings through land rental market. Meanwhile, the e¤ect of mismatch created
by FLR is large enough to overcome the negative e¤ect of tenure insecurity.
In contrast, e¢ cient land reallocation is more likely to be conducted in small scale (i.e., PLR).
For instance, if some households in the village farm less intensively, I expect that village leaders only
reallocate the land of those households to other households who farm intensively (Rozelle and Li,
1998). It appears that PLR reects the farming ability and willingness to farm across households
and thus substitutes the e¤ect of land rental market.
Do our estimates make quantitative sense? One more FLR experienced by the household,
holding mean values of other controls, increase the probability that the household will rent in land
by 2.1 percent point. Note that this 2.1 percentage point is a lower bound of the e¤ect of mismatch
on household land rental. For PLR, one more PLR experienced by the household, at the mean
value of other covariates, decrease the probability that the household will rent in land by 1.5 percent
point which is 0.6 percent point lower than the e¤ect of FLR. In terms of land rental area, one
more FLR experienced by the household would expand the area rented in by 2.1 mu while one more
PLR experienced by the household decrease the area rented in by 1.3 mu. For a household with
median productivity in our data, this additional 2.1 mu would translate into 1514 yuan increase of
production from initial 2883 yuan.
All the other covariates are by and large in the expected sign. Although in a marginal signicant
level, aged household head are more likely to rent in land and very old household head will not
do so37. Interestingly, households with more per capita land are more likely to rent in land. This
may because household with more arable land intend to obtain scale economy of farming, mostly
contributed by the development of advanced farm technology. Households with more "consumers"
(i.e., old members and females) are less likely to rent in land because of labor constraint. And
cadre household seems have no e¤ect on household land rental behavior. Consistent with previous
ndings, households with more members participating in o¤-farm work are less likely to rent in
land or rent in land in small areas. Similarly, the negative coe¢ cients of household education and
nonfarm asset suggest that educated households and households with more nonfarm assets can
easily diversify their income source and thus are less likely to rent in land. Households with more
hogs which may provide more land fertilizer are more likely to rent in land and it seems that cattle
power does not help much for farming. Households in villages near county centre would benet
more from o¤-farm market development and thus are less likely to rent in land or rent in land in
37The turning point is about 42 years old. This may because of the life cycle constraint.
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small areas. Both land rental sanction and rent appears not to be a source of transaction cost for
household who want to rent in land.
6.1.2 Why FLR and PLR Have No E¤ect on Household Land Rental Behavior in
Supply Side
Table 6 reports the main results on the supply side38. Unexpectedly, coe¢ cients of FLR and PLR
are both insignicant in columns 3 and 6 (i.e., the full model for Probit and Tobit)39. How to
interpret that? A simple and quick guess is that households who rent out land are mostly migrant
households. When the surveyor come to households who rent out land, all the family members have
already settle in the urban area, working and living. So our raw data under report households in
the supply side which is common in rural household survey (Lohmar, Zhang and Somwaru, 2001).
This is possible since in our sample, 15% households rented in land and and 10% households rented
out land, but the area rented in per household is about six times larger than the area rented out
(1.43 mu versus 0.23 mu). Combined with the fact that few villagers rented in or out their land
from or to people outside the village (Che, 2009), there must be many under reported households
in the supply side. Consequently, missing values in the supply side of land rental market render
our estimates not precise.
However, the above explanation cannot provide the mechanism why sample truncation in supply
side would cause the e¤ect of FLR and PLR on household land rental behavior insignicant. I favor
another explanation here. Total income of households who rent out land in our sample is 39417 yuan
while the total income of households who rent in land is 22015 yuan. This large income di¤erence is
largely driven by o¤-farm incomes, 18746 yuan for out-rentees and 6396 yuan for in-rentees, though
farm income adjusted o¤-farm income di¤erence a little bit, 1394 yuan for out-rentees and 9634
yuan for in-rentees40. Combined with fact that households in the demand side have high incentive
to farm for living, this evidence of income di¤erence may suggest that households in the supply
side are not sensitive to the benet they get from land renting while in-rentees are very sensitive to
the benet of land rental. In other words, the utility function faced by in-rentees and out-rentees
are di¤erent. This is especially true if the rent is low. For example, in our sample, the rent is only
79 yuan per mu for one year41. At the same time, to rent out land, out-rentees have to "advertise"
the information that they want to rent out land, negotiate with the other party about terms in the
contract, sign contract, collect rent and so on. At the same time, out-rentees may want to enjoy
leisure rather than rent out their land in this case, especially the benet is low.
How to link these facts to the insignicant e¤ect of FLR and PLR on household land rental
38All the covariates are largely the mirror of demand sides. To save space, we do not interpret the coe¢ cients of
covariates explicitly.
39One point here is that Probit and Tobit model ts the data better in the supply side than in the demand side
reected by the increased pseudo R-square in columns 3 and 6 of table 6, 0.27 and 0.14 respectively. It seems that
our models in the supply side have larger prediction capability than in demand side.
40In this paper, we use in-rentor or in-rentee to represent households who rented in land and out-rentor or out-
rentee to denote households who rented out land.
41Average rent for in-rentees is 326 yuan per arable land in our sample.
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behavior? Suppose that the rent for both in-rentees and out-rentees is r, T is the time needed to
rent in land or rent out land, the transaction cost of land renal is c for both parties and p is the
production of rented land for in-rentees. In case of FLR, after FLR, if household i have area of
land A to provide in the land rental market compared to its optimal land holding A, the utility
household i get from land rental Uout(r  c) is smaller than the utility get by enjoying leisure time
Uout(T ). This is possible because r is low and c is high in the village (Zhang, Ma and Xu, 2004;
Deininger and Jin, 2005). So household i would not participate in land rental market although
mismatch exists. If after FLR household i want to rent in land, the utility i get by renting in land is
Uin(p  r  c) and the utility i get by enjoying leisure is Uin(T ). Because it is reasonable to assume
that p is large for households who want to rent in land, I expect Uin(p  r  c) > Uin(T ) and thus i
would participate in land rental market. Overall, I observe signicant e¤ect of FLR on household
land rental behavior in demand side but not in supply side. By the same token, households who
initially want to rent in land obtain land after PLR (i.e., their residual ability of farming is satised
by the additional land provided by PLR), so I observe negative e¤ect of PLR on household land
rental in demand side. However, although in the process of PLR village leaders conscate a part of
land from households who initially want to rent out land, they enjoy other sources of income and
have no interest for farming even using the remaining land. So they may further participate in land
rental market in supply side. In this case, I cannot observe negative e¤ect of PLR on household
land rental behavior in supply side (i.e., households in supply side are not sensitive to farming).
6.2 Robustness Checks
In this section, I perform a number of robustness checks for our main results.
Alternative Dummy Dependent Variable Models: in probit model, I assume that the
error term follows standard normal distribution. To check whether this assumption are driving our
baseline results, I provide results using other alternative dummy dependent variable models: linear
probability model assuming error term asymptotically follows t distribution, logit model assuming
error term follows logistic distribution and semi-parametric model not assuming any distribution of
the error term (Gallant and Nychka, 1987). Estimation results are shown in Table 7. Basically, our
benchmark results of the e¤ects of FLR and PLR on household land rental behavior are not a¤ected:
there is positive e¤ect of FLR and negative e¤ect of PLR on household land rental behavior on
demand side while there is no e¤ect of FLR and PLR on household land rental behavior on supply
side.
Subsample Analysis: in heilongjiang province, the average per household arable land is 22.1
mu which is much higher than other provinces 3.6 mu. In contrast, within zhejiang province, average
share of o¤-farm workers in the household is 0.39 while the average share of o¤-farm workers in other
provinces is just 0.23. In order to assure that households in these two provinces are not "outliers",
I omit observations in heilongjiang and zhejiang separately in Table 8. Again, our estimates of
FLR and PLR on household land rental behavior are una¤ected.
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Alternative Measures of FLR and PLR: Tables 9 and 10 provide results using two alter-
native measures of FLR and PLR. In table 9, I use a dummy indicating whether the latest land
reallocation is FLR or PLR. Because I cannot estimate the e¤ect of latest land reallocation being
FLR on household land rental behavior while controlling for the latest land reallocation being PLR,
I include dummy whether the latest land reallocation is FLR or PLR separately. By and large, our
main results preserved. The mismatch e¤ect created by FLR is signicant now in both demand
and supply side. It seems that PLR, this time, only a¤ects extensive margin of land rental in
demand side and does not a¤ect extensive margin of land rental in demand side. Again, PLR does
not a¤ect households who intend to rent out land. In Table 10, I use a dummy indicating whether
the household only experienced FLR or PLR as alternative measures for FLR and PLR. The same
as before, to alleviate multicollinearity problem, I included FLR and PLR separately. The results
from Table 10 indicates that they have little e¤ect of our main results and the mismatch e¤ect
created by FLR spreads to the supply side again.
7 Welfare Analysis
7.1 E¢ ciency Gain of Land Rental Market: Are In-rentee Households
More productive?
An intriguing question after our analysis above is that are in-rentee households more productive
than out-rentee households or households in autarky? Following Lohmar, Zhang and Somwaru
(2001), I provide a speculative estimation of e¢ ciency gain of land rental market in rural China.
Consider Cobb-Douglas household agricultural production function Qi = ALi K

i , where Q if
value of farm production calculated at market price (Benjamin and Brandt, 2002), A is solow
residual and L is farm labor and K is area of operational land. Taking log of this function and
augment it with share of o¤-farm members, land quality, fertilizer investment, number of hogs,
number of cattle and in-rentee household dummy which is our interest, I can get the estimation
equation as follows:
lnQi = lnAi + rentini +  lnLi +  lnKi + 1offi + 2qualityi
+3fertilizeri + 4hogi + 5cattlei + p + "i (4)
where p is province xed e¤ects and "i is the error term. Table 11 presents estimates of
equation (4). Column 1 of Table 11 is result only including renting in land household dummy as
independent variable, column 2 of Table 11 further includes household controls and column 3 of
Table 11 add province xed e¤ects. In all cases,  is positive and highly signicant, 1.186 with a
standard error of 0.247 in column 3. It indicates that, holding other controls constant, households
19
who rent in land produce 118.6% more than other households42. Now consider Taohua village
in Hunan province which has the median number of households in our sample 436, the median
production of households in the village is 1708 yuan and percentage of households who rented in
land is 23.8%. According to our estimates of equation (4), land rental market development increases
farm production in Taohua village by 210672 yuan. Note that farm cost is not excluded here. This
correction of land misallocation is not trivial given the fact that annual average household farm
income is only 941 yuan.
8 Conclusion
Although according to laws in China, land reallocation is prohibited to preserve land tenure security.
However, survey evidences indicate that by ignoring these related laws, village leaders reallocate
land periodically to adjust household population change (Kimura, Otsuka, Sonobe and Rozelle,
2011). Interestingly, village leaders reallocate land in two ways (i.e., FLR and PLR). In the process
of FLR, village leaders rst conscate all the land in the households and then distribute the land
equally among villagers. Villagers usually cannot keep the same plot of land after FLR. In the
process of PLR, village leaders only reallocate a portion of land from one household to another
who need to do so. By using a data set surveyed by DRC in 2003, this paper shows that FLR are
more likely to follow egalitarian rule of land distribution and PLR takes into account of households
agricultural productivity.
I then evaluates the relative e¤ects of FLR and PLR on household land rental behavior in rural
China. Econometric evidences suggest that households experienced more FLR are more likely to
participate in land rental market to adjust the mismatch between farming ability and land size
created by egalitarian FLR while households experienced more PLR are less likely to participate
in land rental market supporting that PLR and land rental market are substitutes (Brand, Roselle
and Turner, 2004). Empirical results also indicate that land rental market has a large positive
impact on total farm production in the village.
The caveat of the paper is that FLR and PLR may be endogenous in the process of household
land rental behavior. For example, it is possible that FLR and PLR are measured with error,
village leaders reallocate land based on household land rental participation status (i.e., reverse
causality) and some household omitted variables correlated both FLR, PLR and household land
rental behavior. Although I can argue that land reallocation to households is a top-down process
which can be exogenous, this paper need separable instruments for FLR and PLR econometrically.
I consider nding convincible instruments or possible experimental methods as future work.
42It seems that land quality, o¤ farm labor share and number of hogs in the households are important determinants
of farm production while farm labor, land quality and fertilizer investment and number of cattle in the household
are not that important household farm production function.
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              Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables      
Rent In 2102 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Rent Out 2102 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Rent In Size 2102 1.43 8.42 0 200 
Rent Out Size 2102 0.23 1.04 0 21 
Variables of Interest      
FLR 2102 1.44 1.69 0 8 
PLR 2102 0.68 1.47 0 20 
Household Level Controls      
Per Capita Arable Land 2102 1.77 2.65 0 40.67
HH Head Age 2100 46.75 11.24 20 86 
HH Head Age Square 2100 2312.09 1111.25 400 7396
Cadre Household 2102 0.18 0.39 0 1 
HH Head Education 2102 2.62 0.87 0 8 
Population <16 2102 0.73 0.74 0 4 
Population 16-60 2102 2.90 1.23 0 8 
Population >60 2102 0.38 0.66 0 3 
Female Ratio 2102 0.49 0.16 0 1 
Share of Off Farm Workers 2102 0.25 0.24 0 1 
Agricultural Tax 2102 4.60 1.53 0 7.40 
Non-farm Assets 2102 0.84 2.81 0 14.69
Hogs 2102 0.91 1.20 0.01 7.86 
Cattles 2102 0.05 0.20 0.01 2.30 
Village Level Controls      
Distance to County 2077 22.82 15.85 0.2 70 
Sanction 2102 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Rent 2102 0.08 0.26 0 2.5 
 
 
 
 
        Table 2: Procedures of FLR among Villages Conducting FLR (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
                 
             Table 3: Willingness of Land Holding 
 Increase or Decrease (%) No Change (%) 
No FLR and PLR (5.1%) 50.51 49.49 
Only PLR (34.3%) 47.46 52.54 
Both FLR and PLR (32.3%) 51.13 48.87 
Only FLR (28.2%) 60.45 39.55 
Notes: Data source is DRC 2003 Survey. We divided the sample into 4 groups: villages conducting  
no FLR and PLR, villages conducting only PLR, villages conducting both FLR and PLR and  
villages conducting only FLR. Percentage of households in each group is in the parenthesis.   
 
                          Table 4: Household Land Rental Activity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Villagers’ session 85.5
Selecting villagers’ deputy 72.7
Estimating size of land 72.7
Lottery for land 74.6
Issuing new land contract 70.9
Province Rent in (%) Rent out (%) Area  in (mu) Area out (mu) Land reallocation Frequency 
Hunan 13.2 11.2 0.27 0.19 2.75 
Zhejiang 18.6 22.3 2.40 0.28 1.74 
Fujian 22.8 12.8 1.63 0.54 3.97 
Sichuan 14.8 8.8 0.21 0.15 1.18 
Anhui 8.8 4.6 0.38 0.11 1.68 
Heilongjiang 11.7  0.9 3.69 0.11 0.89 
Average 15.0 10.1 1.43 0.23 2.0 
                           Table 5: Results for Household Renting In Land 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Probit Model 
DV: Whether Household Rented In Land
Tobit Model 
DV: Area of Land Rented In 
Variable of Interest       
Frequency of FLR 0.083*** 0.096*** 0.103*** 1.728*** 2.135*** 2.114*** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.031) (0.495) (0.509) (0.674) 
Frequency of PLR -0.065** -0.047* -0.078** -2.132*** -0.741 -1.323** 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.032) (0.824) (0.578) (0.658) 
Household Level Controls       
Per Capita Arable Land  0.033** 0.114***  2.264*** 3.522*** 
  (0.014) (0.023)  (0.425) (0.391) 
Household Head Age  0.050* 0.037  1.086 0.724 
  (0.028) (0.027)  (0.748) (0.669) 
Household Head Age Square  -0.001** -0.001*  -0.014* -0.011 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.008) (0.007) 
Cadre Household  0.022 -0.069  1.534 -0.961 
  (0.097) (0.100)  (2.291) (2.390) 
Household Head Education  -0.110** -0.093*  -2.591** -2.007* 
  (0.049) (0.049)  (1.122) (1.034) 
Household Population <16 Years Old  -0.084 -0.075  -1.557 -1.327 
  (0.056) (0.057)  (1.346) (1.262) 
Household Population 16-60 Years  -0.017 0.014  0.183 0.865 
  (0.037) (0.038)  (0.809) (0.766) 
Household Population >60 Years  -0.127* -0.142**  -2.610 -2.994* 
  (0.069) (0.070)  (1.709) (1.633) 
Female Ratio  -0.452** -0.547**  -12.114* -13.581** 
  (0.226) (0.232)  (6.646) (6.797) 
Share of Off Farm Workers  -0.367** -0.706***  -8.690* -17.320***
  (0.174) (0.183)  (5.266) (6.152) 
Agricultural Tax  -0.036 0.034  -1.381** 0.553 
  (0.027) (0.031)  (0.649) (0.735) 
Non-agricultural Assets  -0.028* -0.044***  -0.282 -0.663 
  (0.016) (0.016)  (0.518) (0.448) 
Number of Hogs  0.165*** 0.159***  2.964*** 2.624*** 
  (0.028) (0.029)  (0.697) (0.684) 
Number of Cattles  0.132 0.185  -0.418 0.718 
  (0.169) (0.177)  (3.682) (3.639) 
Village Level Controls       
Distance to County  -0.004* -0.009***  -0.043 -0.145*** 
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.054) (0.052) 
Renting Allowed  0.058 0.026  4.470 4.694 
  (0.116) (0.129)  (3.072) (3.119) 
Average Rent  0.190 -0.004  3.766 -1.276 
  (0.124) (0.134)  (2.549) (2.729) 
Province Dummies No No Yes No No Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.06 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -873 -816 -779 -1981 -1890 -1849 
Observations 2102 2075 2075 2102 2075 2075 
Notes: White's robust standard errors are in parentheses. DV represents dependent variable.       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                    Table 6: Results for Household Renting Out Land 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Probit Model 
DV: Whether Household Rented Out Land
Tobit Model 
DV: Area of Land Rented Out 
Variable of Interest       
FLR 0.042** 0.020 -0.026 0.279*** 0.184 -0.094 
 (0.020) (0.027) (0.034) (0.105) (0.113) (0.130) 
PLR -0.002 0.002 -0.028 -0.053 -0.009 -0.110 
 (0.022) (0.027) (0.031) (0.111) (0.109) (0.122) 
Household Level Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Village Level Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Province Dummies No No Yes No No Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.24 0.27 0.00 0.13 0.14 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -685 -508 -491 -1077 -905 -887 
Observations 2102 2075 2075 2102 2075 2075 
Notes: White's standard errors clustered at province level are in parentheses. DV represents dependent  
variable. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             Table 7: Alternative Dummy Dependent Variable Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 LPM Logit Semi-parametric LPM Logit Semi-parametric 
 DV: Whether Household Rented In Land DV: Whether Household Rented Out Land
Variable of Interest   
FLR 0.024*** 0.184*** 0.217** -0.002 -0.058 -0.025 
 (0.007) (0.056) (0.091) (0.006) (0.063) (0.024) 
PLR -0.013*** -0.148** -0.090* -0.005 -0.064 -0.041 
 (0.004) (0.061) (0.048) (0.003) (0.063) (0.033) 
Household Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.10 0.11  0.20 0.27  
Log Pseudo Likelihood  -777 -767  -488 -476 
Observations 2075 2075 2075 2075 2075 2075 
Notes: white's standard errors clustered at province level are in parentheses. DV represents dependent  
variable. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             Table 8: Subsamples for Robustness 
 Excluding Heilongjiang Province Excluding Zhejiang Province 
 Probit 
Rented In 
Tobit 
Size Rented In
Probit 
Rented Out
Tobit 
Size Rented out 
Probit 
Rented In
Tobit 
Size Rented In
Probit 
Rented out
Tobit 
Size Rented Out 
FLR 0.097*** 1.417** -0.020 -0.067 0.078** 1.451*** -0.042 -0.181 
 (0.032) (0.618) (0.034) (0.106) (0.035) (0.533) (0.039) (0.187) 
PLR -0.077** -1.016* -0.026 -0.083 -0.067* -1.020* -0.017 -0.113 
 (0.032) (0.539) (0.031) (0.097) (0.035) (0.589) (0.034) (0.171) 
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.05 0.24 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.26 0.15 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -663 -1543 -472 -821 -630 -1408 -339 -601 
Observations 1727 1727 1727 1727 1726 1726 1726 1726 
Notes: white's standard errors clustered at province level are in parentheses.        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                Table 9: Alternative Measures of FLR and PLR: Latest Land Reallocation is FLR or PLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Probit  Tobit  Probit  Tobit  
 Rented In Size Rented In Rented Out Size Rented Out 
Latest Land Reallocation is FLR 0.367***  7.582***  0.218**  0.880**  
 (0.096)  (2.201)  (0.110)  (0.416)  
Latest Land Reallocation is PLR  -0.206**  -2.839  -0.042  -0.262 
  (0.091)  (2.158)  (0.106)  (0.393)
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2075 2075 2075 2075 2075 2075 2075 2075 
Notes: white's standard errors clustered at province level are in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                Table 10: Alternative Measures of FLR and PLR: Only Experienced FLR or PLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Probit 
Rented In 
Tobit 
Size Rented In 
Probit 
Rented Out 
Tobit 
Size Rented Out 
Only Experienced FLR 0.288***  5.813***  0.217**  0.891**  
 (0.095)  (2.103)  (0.106)  (0.402)  
Only Experienced PLR  -0.227**  -4.865**  0.040  0.021 
  (0.093)  (2.416)  (0.113)  (0.419)
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village Controls Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.27 0.27 0.15 0.14 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -784 -786 -1852 -1853 -490 -492 -885 -888 
Observations 2075 2075 2075 2075 2075 2075 2075 2075 
Notes: white's robust standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
                Table 11: Are In-rentee Households More productive? 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Dependent Variable is Value of Farm Production 
Rent In Dummy 1.537*** 1.242*** 1.186*** 
 (0.284) (0.232) (0.247) 
Arable Land  1.728*** 1.929*** 
  (0.151) (0.464) 
Labor  0.227 0.081 
  (0.164) (0.236) 
Share of Off Farm Members  -0.550** -1.340*** 
  (0.166) (0.327) 
Land Quality  0.488 0.228 
  (0.246) (0.176) 
Fertilizer  0.048 0.023 
  (0.111) (0.095) 
Number of Hogs  0.190** 0.328*** 
  (0.066) (0.081) 
Number of Cattles  -0.105 -0.052 
  (0.317) (0.333) 
Province Dummies No No Yes 
Observations 2102 2102 2102 
R-squared 0.03 0.23 0.29 
Notes: White's robust standard errors clustered at province level are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Trend of Household Land Rental Market Participation 
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        Source: Zhang, Ma and Xu (2004), Brandt, Huang, Li and Rozelle (2002) and Lohmar, Zhang and Somwaru (2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             Figure 2: Geographical Distribution of Surveyed Provinces  
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       Figure 3A: Number of FLR and Percentage of Households Rented In Land 
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       Figure 3B: Number of FLR and Percentage of Households Rented Out Land 
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       Figure 3C: Number of FLR and Average Size of Land Rented In 
0
1
2
3
4
0 2 4 6 8
Number of FLR
Rent In Land Size Fitted values
 
 
       Figure 3D: Number of FLR and Average Size of Land Rented Out 
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       Figure 4A: Number of PLR and Percentage of Households Rented In Land 
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       Figure 4B: Number of PLR and Percentage of Households Rented Out Land 
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       Figure 4C: Number of PLR and Average Size of Land Rented In 
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       Figure 4D: Number of PLR and Average Size of Land Rented Out 
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Figure 5A: Demand Recovery Land Rental after FLR When the Household is Initially in Autarky 
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Figure 5B: Supply Recovery Land Rental after FLR When the Household is Initially in Autarky 
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Figure 6A: Demand Recovery Land Rental after FLR When Household Initially Rented in Land 
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Figure 6B: No Land Rental after FLR When the Household Initially Rented in Land 
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Figure 6C: Supply Recovery Land Rental after FLR When the Household Initially Rented in Land 
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Figure 6D: Land Rental after FLR When the Household Initially Rented in Land 
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Figure 7A: Supply Recovery Land Rental after FLR When the Household Initially Rented in Land 
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Figure 7B: No Land Rental after FLR When the Household Initially Rented in Land 
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Figure 7C: Land Rental after FLR When the Household Initially Rented in Land 
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Figure 7D: Demand Recovery Land Rental after FLR When Household Initially Rented in Land 
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                 Figure 8: Land Rental after PLR  
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                         Appendix Table A Definition of Variables 
Dependent Variables  
Rent In Household rented in land is one, others zero 
Rent Out Household rented out land is one, others zero 
Rent In Size Area rented in where the unit is mu 
Rent Out Size Area rented out where unit is mu 
Variables of Interest  
FLR Number of FLR experienced by the household since HRS 
PLR Number of PLR experienced by the household since HRS 
Household Level Controls  
Per Capita Arable Land Arable land in the household divided by household size 
HH Head Age Age of household head 
HH Head Age Square Age square of household head 
Cadre Household Dummy equals to one if more than one member in the household is cadre 
HH Head Education Education level of household head 
Population <16 Number of household members whose age is less that sixteen year old 
Population 16-60 Number of household members whose age is between 16 years old and 60 years old 
Population >60 Number of household members whose age is more than 60 years old 
Female Ratio Number of females divided by number males in the household 
Share of Off-farm Workers Number of household members doing off-farm work divided by household size 
Agricultural Tax Log of agricultural tax paid by the household in year 2002 
Non-farm Assets Total value of houses, transportation instruments, small business assets and so on 
Hogs Log of number of hog in the household 
Cattles Log of number of cattle in the household 
Village Level Controls  
Distance to County Distance of village to county centre in kilometer 
Sanction Dummy equals to one if sanction is required for households who want to rent in or rent out land
Rent Village average value of rent for households who participate in land rental market 
 
 
 
 
